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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the twenty-first century, the use of drones in military 
combat operations is one of the most legally controversial issues 
confronting international humanitarian law (IHL) and the law of 
armed conflict (LOAC).1 This article argues that drones should be 
treated as any other component of the United States’ (U.S.)2 arsenal. 
A drone can be considered to be a weapons platform or singular 
weapon system. This article further argues that drones indeed offer 
extensive and enhanced opportunities for compliance with LOAC 
and other relevant laws governing the use of certain weapons. 
Particularly, drones are well suited to execute theories of self-defense 
in international affairs. In fact, drones can be used for a wide variety 
of tasks other than kinetic operations, such as: observation and 
reconnaissance, intelligence collection, target acquisition, search and 
rescue, delivery of humanitarian aid, and transportation of 
equipment.3 The appearance of new and advanced weapons in 
warfare is hardly a new challenge in the history of armed conflict.4 
The epic poem Mahabharatha, [200 B.C.-200 A.D.] forbids the use of 
‘hyper-destructive’ weapons: the warrior Arjuna, observing the law of 
war, refrained from using the pasupathastra5 because when the fight 
was restricted to ordinary conventional weapons, the use of 
                                                 
1 Michael W. Lewis, Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEX. INT'L. 
L. J. 294 (2011-12). 
2 Hereinafter, United States referred to as U.S. 
3 David Turns, Droning on: some international humanitarian law aspects of the use of 
unmanned aerial vehicles in contemporary armed conflicts, CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES 
TO THE LAWS OF WAR, 199 (2014). 
4 Rayan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. 
INT'L L. & POL'Y, 103 (2010-2011). 
5 See generally, Section XL, http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/m03/ 
m03040.htm, Pasupathastra: capable of destroying all beings and creation itself, this 
weapon should not be hurled without adequate cause; for if hurled at any foe of 
little might it may destroy the whole universe. In the three worlds with all their 
mobile and immobile creatures, there is none who is incapable of being slain by this 
weapon. And it may be hurled by the mind, by the eye, by words, and by the bow. 
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extraordinary or unconventional weapons was not even moral, let 
alone in conformity with religion or recognized rules of warfare.6  
At different times in history, developments such as the 
crossbow, gunpowder, machine guns, tanks, airplanes, noxious 
gasses, nuclear bombs, and a number of other deadly inventions 
irreversibly changed the landscape of warfare and required 
combatants to reassess the laws governing armed conflict.7 Drones 
have become a central instrument in armed conflict, and an 
increasing number of states and even non-state actors have deployed 
them in some way or another – although Western armies clearly have 
a significant technological advantage in this respect.8 Legal scholars 
have expressed a variety of opinions on the use of drones.9 On one 
hand, scholars argue that drones are lawful weapons under 
international law in a time of armed conflict, while on the other hand, 
critics argue that drones are being used in ways that violate 
international law.10 The legality of drones has been questioned for a 
variety of reasons, some more grounded in fact than others, but 
despite this criticism there is little question that the use of drones in 
surveillance and combat roles is on the rise.11  
The recent proliferation of drones has spawned intellectual 
debate on whether a country has the right under the LOAC and 
international law to unilaterally deploy these remotely controlled 
aircrafts abroad for military purposes. The use of drones in support 
of combat operations – particularly striking distant terror operatives – 
has become the most controversial legal topic.12 Many of the most-
frequently expressed criticisms about drones and drone warfare do 
not hold up well under serious scrutiny or, at any rate, there’s nothing 
                                                 
6 GRAY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 7 (2010). 
7 Vogel, supra note 4 at 103. 
8 Ferderic Megret, The Humanitarian Problem with Drones, 5 UT. L. REV. 1284 
(2013). 
9 Shani Dann, Drone Strikes and IHL, (Nov. 6, 2014) 
http://humanityinwarblog.com/2014/11/06/drone-strikes-and-ihl/. 
10 Id.  
11 Lewis, supra note 1, at 294.  
12 Heeyong Daniel Jang, The Lawfulness of and Case for Combat Drones in the 
Fight Against Terrorism, 2:1 NAT'L L.J. 2 (2013-2014). 
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uniquely different or worse about drones when compared to other 
military technologies.13 Consider the most common anti-drone 
argument: drones kill a disproportionate number of civilian non-
combatants.14 However, drones kill fewer civilians, as a percentage of 
total fatalities, than any other military weapon.15 According to the 
U.N.’s mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)16 2012 report, the number 
of Afghan civilian casualties caused by the United States and its allies 
did not increase in 2012, in fact, they decreased by 46 percent. More 
specifically, civilian casualties from 'aerial attacks' fell 42 percent.17 
The UNAMA report found that drones released 506 weapons in 
2012, compared to 294 from the previous year.18 Five incidents 
resulted in casualties with sixteen civilians killed and three wounded, 
up from just one incident in 2011.19 Even as drone attacks increased, 
the U.N. reported an overall decrease in civilian deaths by airstrikes 
with the U.S.-led coalition implementing stricter measures to prevent 
innocent people from being killed.20 In another empirical report 
concerning drone strikes cited by The New York Times, 522 strikes 
have killed an estimated 3,376 militants and 476 civilians, decimating 
al-Qaida leadership even as the loss of innocent life intensifies anti-
American sentiment in nations where strikes occur.21 Further, 
according to The Long War Journal, an estimated 801 militant deaths in 
                                                 
13 Rosa Brooks, The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted 
Killing: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. On the Constitution, Civil Rights, and 
Human Rights, 113TH CONG., 2 (April 23, 2013) (Statement by Professor Rosa 
Brooks, Geo. U. L. Center), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewconte 
nt.cgi?article=1114&context=cong 
14 Id.  
15 William Saletan, In Defense of Drones, SLATE, (Feb. 2013) 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2013/02/dron
es.  
16 Hereinafter, U.N.’s mission in Afghanistan referred to as “UNAMA” or 
“UNAMA’s”. 
17 Saletan, supra note 15.  
18 Kim Gamel, UN: Drones killed more Afghan civilians in 2012, YAHOO NEWS, 
(Feb. 19, 2013) https://www.yahoo.com/news/un-drones-killed-more-afghan-
civilians-2012-145931602.html?ref=gs. 
19 Id. 
20 Id.  
21 Steven Simon, In Defense of Drones, MSNBC (Apr. 26, 2015), 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/defense-drones. 
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Pakistan occurred from U.S. drone strikes in 2010.22 This figure is 
significantly higher than the 195 drone-caused deaths occurring from 
2004 to 2007.'23 
In contrast, several claims of civilian casualties caused by 
conventional aircrafts and weaponry have gone underreported. For 
example, an interview conducted by The Economist with twenty 
residents of the Pakistani tribal areas confirmed that many residents 
view individual drone strikes as preferable to the artillery barrages of 
the Pakistani military.24 The residents insisted that the drones do not 
kill as many civilians—a view starkly at odds with mainstream 
Pakistani opinion.25 An elder from North Waziristan stated, “No one 
dares to tell the real picture. Drone attacks are killing the militants 
who are killing innocent people.”26 Jet planes, artillery attacks, and 
bombings are the problem, not drones. Critics often assert that U.S. 
drone strikes are morally wrong because they kill innocent civilians.27 
This is undoubtedly both true and tragic, but nonetheless, it does not 
validate the arguments against drone strikes.28 War kills innocent 
civilians, period.29 But the best evidence currently available suggests 
that U.S. drone strikes kill fewer civilians than most other common 
means of warfare.30 The operational effectiveness of drones is 
undisputed. Martha McSally, former fighter pilot and drone squadron 
commander for the U.S. Air Force, stated in her April 23, 2013 
testimony to the Senate Judiciary Sub-Committee on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, “once a decision has 
been made that it is a legal and wise strategy to conduct a target 
strike, the [drone] platform is usually the hands-down best choice to 
maximize precision, persistent intelligence, responsiveness, and 
                                                 
22 Jang, supra note 12. 
23 Id. 
24 Kenneth Anderson & Benjamin Wittes, Three Deep Flaws in Two New 
Human-Rights Reports on U.S. Drone Strikes, NEW REPUBLIC, (Oct. 24, 2013) 
https://newrepublic.com/article/115329/amnesty-international-human-rights-
watch-drone-reports-are-flawed  
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Brooks, supra note 13.  
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
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oversight by commanders, intelligence and legal experts. It also has 
the benefit of minimizing civilian casualties without risk of U.S. 
casualties and at relatively low cost.”31 Additionally, drone pilots 
located in air-conditioned trailers on secure bases are far less likely to 
err than fighter pilots, who have to deal with numerous other factors 
while on missions.32 According to one international legal expert: 
There is little reason to treat drones as distinct from 
other weapons systems with regard to the legal 
consequences of their employment. Nor is there a 
sound basis for heightened concern as to their use. 
On the contrary, the use of drones may actually, in 
certain cases, enhance the protections to which 
various persons and objects are entitled under 
LOAC.33 
The use of drones must therefore be carefully weighed 
against the fact that it creates enemies, even as it destroys them. 
Under that logic, the same argument might as well be used against all 
airstrikes, or for that matter, artillery strikes.34 Both of these 
alternatives tend to be more indiscriminate in their effects than 
drones.35  
This article argues that drones should be treated as any other 
component of the U.S. arsenal. A drone can be considered a weapons 
platform or a single weapon system. In addition, this article argues 
that drones indeed offer extensive and enhanced opportunities for 
compliance with LOAC and laws governing the use of certain 
weapons. Particularly, drones are well-suited to execute theories of 
self-defense in international affairs.  
                                                 
31 Martha McSally, Should the United States Continue Its Use of Drone Strikes 
Abroad?, PROCON.ORG, (last updated Apr. 29, 2015) 
http://drones.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=001894. 
32 Simon, supra note 21.  
33 MICHAEL SCHMITT, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 313 (2010). 
34 Simon, supra note 21.  
35 Id. 
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The first part of the article provided a general overview of 
drones and their modern day implications. The second section will 
discuss the definition of drones and the technological capabilities of 
an armed drone. The third section will discuss the legality per se of 
drones as a weapon system in association with general principles of 
LOAC (i.e. military necessity, humanity, distinction and 
proportionality). In addition, the third portion will also explore the 
application of just war theory and its two components, jus as bellum 
and jus in bello. In the fourth section, this article demonstrates how 
effective drones can be in executing self-defense operations, 
illustrated by a case study of the U.S. drone strategy during the War 
on Terror. Generally, this article examines the legality of drone strikes 
under LOAC based upon the geographical location of a given target. 
Finally, the article will conclude by exploring military command 
responsibility for the violations of LOAC during drone operations 
and the legal status of the drone operator.  
II.  DRONES 
The term “drone” is consistently and materially employed 
throughout this article, as such, there is a need to stipulate to a 
working definition because of the term’s importance here. 
A.  What Exactly is a Drone?  
To ensure the same basic understanding of the term from the 
outset, this preliminary definition should help readers in addressing 
the legal issues that underlie the use of drones. Categorically, "drone" 
refers to any unmanned, remotely-piloted, flying craft ranging from 
something as small as a radio-controlled toy helicopter, to the 32,000-
pound, $104 million Global Hawk military drone.36 In determining 
what exactly constitutes a drone under this language one considers 
whether the vehicle or flying craft at issue (1) flies and (2) is 
                                                 
36 Kelsey D. Atherton, Flying Robots 101: Everything You Need to Know About 
Drones, POPULAR SCI. (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/ 
2013-03/drone-any-other-name. 
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controlled by a pilot on the ground; if the vehicle meets this criteria it 
falls under the everyday-language definition of drone.37 The U.S. 
Army officially defines a drone as “a land, sea, or air vehicle that is 
remotely or automatically controlled.”38  Military drones are also 
referred to as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned 
Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), or hunter-killers.39 The history of 
drones is that of a watchful eye turned weapon.40 The drone is not a 
projectile, but a projectile-carrying machine.41  
B.  Technology Used in Armed Drones & their Capabilities   
Before learning about the legal aspects governing drones, it is 
important to discuss the relevant technology used in armed drones 
for a better understanding of their legality. The key difference 
between human soldiers on the ground and a drone hovering above 
is that humans have to distinguish and make targeting decisions 
instantly. In contrast, drones give commanders “tactical patience” - 
the ability to see, think, and act in a controlled manner. Drones are 
controlled by a crew often miles away from the dangers of combat, 
and are capable of acting as both a combatant and a combat support 
vehicle in the hairiest of battles.42 Drones combine several 
complimentary technologies on a single platform. 43 For example, a 
single drone can contain highly advanced surveillance systems, live-
feed video cameras, infrared cameras, thermal sensors and radar, and 
various types of other equipment including global positioning 
systems (GPS), and precision munitions.44 The high-tech cameras on 
                                                 
37 Id.  
38 Department of defense, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 
109 (Aug. 2011). (Original Gregoire Chamayou, Translated by Janet Lloyd, A 
THEORY OF THE DRONE 27 (2015). 
39 Lewis, supra note 1, at 294.   
40 GREGOIRE CHAMAYOU, A THEORY OF THE DRONE 11 (2015). 
41 Id. 
42 Robert Valdes, How the Predator UAV Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, (Apr. 
1, 2004) http://science.howstuffworks.com/predator.htm. 
43 James Igoe Walsh, The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and 
Counter terrorism Campaigns, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE AND U.S. ARMY WAR 
COLLEGE PRESS, V (Sep. 2013). 
44 Surveillance Drones, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/surveillance-drones. 
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drones can scan entire cities, or alternatively, zoom in and read a milk 
carton from 60,000 feet.45  Surveillance data gathered by a drone can 
be relayed to satellites that then send it down to ground forces to 
help form attack strategies and identify enemy vulnerabilities.46 
Armed drones carry highly accurate missiles that have the capacity to 
target individuals, automobiles, and sections of structures such as 
rooms in a large house.47 These missiles can be guided by the 
intelligence obtained by the sensors discussed above or through real-
time, on-ground intelligence.48  Drones’ low profile and relative fuel 
efficiency combine to permit them to spend more time on target than 
any other manned aircraft.49 Some military drones can stay airborne 
for hours or days at a time.50 Drones also carry Wi-Fi crackers and 
can act as fake cell phone towers to determine a target’s location or 
intercept texts and phone calls.51 Given the ongoing convergence of 
drones and emerging technologies, it may even become possible for 
drones to perform facial recognition, identify behavior patterns, and 
monitor individuals’ conversations.52 
 A typical drone is made of light composite materials to 
reduce weight and increase maneuverability.53 Drones can fly at 
extremely high altitudes to avoid detection54 and their navigational 
systems can be programmed to operate autonomously, from takeoff 
to landing.55 Drones have distinct advantages over manned aircraft 
vehicles, cruise missiles, and Special Operations attacks.56 The use of 
drones actually permits for far greater precision in targeting than 
                                                 
45 Id.  
46 V. Shalem Pravas, Aerial Assassins: Drones, Read & Digest, (accessed Sept. 
1, 2015), http://readanddigest.com/what-is-a-drone/. 
47 Id. 
48 Walsh, supra note 43. 
49 Robert Valdes, supra note 42. 
50 Surveillance Drones, supra note 44.   
51 Id.   
52 Chris Cole & Jim Wright, What are drones?, DRONE WARS U.K. (Jan. 20, 
2010) wars.net/aboutdrone/" http://dronew 
ars.net/aboutdrone/. 
53 Pravas, supra note 46.  
54 Id.  
55 KENNETH R. HIMES O.F.M., DRONES AND THE ETHICS OF TARGETED 
KILLING 12 (2016). 
56 Id. 
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most other traditional manned aircrafts.57 Further, drones can handle 
what humans cannot: G-Force speed, tedium, and boredom.58 
Among the other “intrinsic benefits” of drones: they deprive the 
enemy of human targets; they don’t get tired, thirsty, or hungry; and 
are relatively inexpensive.59 In a worst-case scenario, if a drone is lost 
in battle military personal can simply "crack another one out of the 
box" and have it up in the air shortly without the trauma of casualties 
or the fear of pilots becoming prisoners; both of which being 
common concerns when more-traditional aircraft or operation 
failures occur.60 Without a doubt, drones are of great benefit to the 
counterterrorism effort.61  
III.  THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
All warfare is governed by IHL, also known as the Law of 
Armed Conflict (LOAC).62  
A.  What is the Law of Armed Conflict? 
The LOAC comes from both customary international law 
and treaties.63 Customary international law, based on a practice that 
nations have come to accept as legally required, establishes the 
traditional rules that govern the conduct of military operations in 
armed conflict.64 The Law of Armed Conflict “arises from a desire 
among civilized nations to prevent unnecessary suffering and 
                                                 
57 Brooks, supra note 13. 
58 Alan W. Dowd, Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings, U.S. ARMY WAR 
COLLEGE (2013), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/ 
Issues/WinterSpring_2013/1_Article_Dowd.pdf. 
59 Id.  
60 Valdes, supra note 42.  
61 Himes, supra note 55.  
62 James Foy, Autonomous Weapons Systems Taking the Human Out of 
International Humanitarian Law, 23 DAL. J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 53 (2014).  
63 Rod Powers, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), THE RULES OF WAR, 
http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/wars/a/loac.htm 
64 Id. 
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destruction while not impeding the effective waging of war.”65 
Indeed, modern LOAC is largely driven by humanitarian concerns.66 
As a part of public international law the LOAC regulates the conduct 
of armed hostilities, but only among consenting nations.67 It also aims 
to protect civilians, prisoners of war, the wounded, sick, and 
shipwrecked.68 The LOAC regulates, among other things, the means 
and methods of warfare – the weapons used and the tactics 
employed.69 At its foundation, the LOAC is based on four key 
principles: distinction, proportionality, unnecessary suffering, and 
military necessity. All of which undergird the spirit and purpose of 
the law and drive determinations in areas such as targeting, detention, 
and treatment of persons.70 The legality of drones can also be 
justified under the principles of weapon laws and targeting laws. The 
four fundamental LOAC principles are discussed in detail in the 
following section. 
When determining the overall lawfulness of a weapon system 
under LOAC, there are two distinct aspects of the law that need to 
be analyzed: weapons law and lawful use of drones.71 The former 
verifies that the weapon itself is lawful.72 Weapon laws determine 
whether the use of the weapon system during hostilities might be 
prohibited in some manner under the law of armed conflict.73 A 
weapon must satisfy two legal aspects before it may lawfully be used 
on a battlefield;74 the weapon should (1) prevent unnecessary 
suffering, and (2) be capable of effectively distinguishing targets. The 
overarching principle that pertains to weapon systems is the 
                                                 
65 Id.  
66 Solis, supra note 6, at 7.  
67 Powers, supra note 63. 
68 Id. 
69 Oren Gross, The New Way of War: Is There a Duty to to Use Drones?,  
7 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 27 (2015). 
70 Laurie R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone strikes impact the law of war?, 
U. Pa. J. Int’l L. vol. 33:3, 681 (Feb. 14, 2012). 
71 Jeffrey Thurnher, The Law That Applies to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 17 
AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 4, (January 18, 2013), https://www.asil.org 
/insights/volume/17/issue/4/law-applies-autonomous-weapon-systems. 
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
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prohibition of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.75 Weapons 
that cannot be directed at specific military objectives, or weaponry 
considered overly dangerous by nature, can violate the principle of 
distinction and found to be unlawful per se.
76 Moreover, even if a 
specific type of weapon is not unlawful per se, or is not specifically 
prohibited by particular treaties, governments are prohibited from 
improperly employing a weapon in a manner that would result in 
unnecessary suffering or in the targeting of civilian populations.77 
Such use is also unlawful under the relevant rules of the LOAC.78 
The two rules governing weapon laws are discussed in detail in the 
following section.  
1. General Principles of the LOAC. 
In this section, the principles of the LOAC will be applied to 
the use of drones in combat and combat support operations. This 
analysis falls squarely within LOAC principles. Again, the LOAC 
revolves around four core principles: distinction, proportionality, 
preventing unnecessary suffering, and military necessity. Application 
of any weapon depends upon these four general principles of the 
LOAC. Additionally, targeting law governs the circumstances of the 
use of lawful weapons and includes general principles of the LOAC. 
The following arguments help establish a basis for the conclusion 
that LOAC rules are sufficient to regulate drones. 
(i) Distinction 
“Distinction” means persons employing force must 
distinguish between lawful military targets (e.g., opposing 
combatants, equipment, or facilities), protected persons (e.g., 
civilians, medical personnel, chaplains, or persons who are hors de 
                                                 
75 Gross, supra note 69. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
DOCUMENT5 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2017 
2017 Sehrawat 5:1 
177 
combat), property, and unlawful targets.79 Greater awareness of the 
distinction principle has coincided with technological developments 
that enable increasingly precise targeting.80 According to Article 48 of 
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention,  
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the 
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to 
the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the 
civilian population and combatants, and between 
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly 
shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives.81  
Through its language, Additional Protocol I prohibits the use 
of weapons that are “of a nature to strike military objectives and 
civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”82  
Far from bombing entire industrial valleys or cities, which 
would inevitably lead to civilians being caught in the crosshairs, new 
technology has allowed states to be far more discriminate.83 Indeed, 
the adoption of drones equipped with precision-guided munitions is 
the most recent improvement.84 Drones equipped with modern 
imaging technologies enable operators located thousands of miles 
away to view details as fine as individual faces; this allows operators 
to distinguish between civilians and combatants far more effectively 
than most other weapons systems.85 According to General (Ret.) 
James E. Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, "advances in high band-width satellite communications, sensing 
                                                 
79 Christopher P. Toscano, “Friend of Humans”: An Argument for Developing 
Autonomous Weapons Systems, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 189 (2010). 
80 JOHN KAAG & SARAH KREPS, DRONE WARFARE 81 (2010). 
81 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), ICRC (8 June 1977) 
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/4e473c7bc8854f2ec12563f60039c738/8a9e7e14c63c7f30
c12563cd0051dc5c?OpenDocument,. 
82 Rule 71, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/ 
v1_rul_rule71. 
83 Kaag & Kreps, supra note 80, at 81. 
84 Id. 
85 Brooks, supra note 13. 
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technologies – particularly full motion video – combined with 
existing aircraft technology has allowed armed drones to emerge as 
the platform of choice in this counter terror mission space.”86  On 
April 30, 2012, CIA Director John Brennan, said, “with the 
unprecedented ability of remotely piloted aircraft to precisely target a 
military objective while minimizing collateral damage, one could 
argue that never before has there been a weapon that allows U.S. to 
distinguish more effectively between an al-Qaida terrorist and 
innocent civilians…[.]”87 Therefore, because drones can effectively 
distinguish between targets, it can be concluded that drones meet the 
standard of distinction under the LOAC. 
(ii) Proportionality 
The LOAC principle of proportionality requires that the 
expected loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property 
incidental to attack not be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated from striking the target.88 Article 
35 of Additional Protocol I declares that “in any armed conflict, the 
right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of 
warfare is not unlimited[;]” this basic principle was officially codified 
by the 1907 Hague Convention, however, studies suggest that similar 
albeit informal principles were commonly observed by combatants 
prior to the Hague Convention.89 The principle focus of 
proportionality seeks to minimize incidental casualties during war and 
operationalizes the LOAC’s fundamental premise that the means and 
methods of attacking the enemy are not unlimited.90 The key here is 
the word “incidental,” meaning outside of the military target.91 
Importantly, however, the law does not prohibit all civilian deaths—
                                                 
86 John Brennan, Should the United States Continue Its Use of Drone Strikes 
Abroad?, PROCON.ORG (Apr. 29, 2015), http://drones.procon.org/view.a 
nswers.php?questionID=001894. 
87 Id.  
88 Basic Principles of LOAC and their Targeting Implications, CURTIS E. LEMAY 
CENTER, https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-60-D33-Target-LOAC 
.pdf (last updated Jan. 10, 2014).  
89 Blank, supra note 70, at 681-82. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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and in fact accepts some incidental civilian casualties.92 Armed drones 
offer the advantage of less destructive weapons and greater command 
and control over firing decisions. Drones can employ Hellfire 
missiles that weigh one-hundred pounds with a warhead of 
approximately thirty five pounds.93
 That is one-twentieth the size of a 
standard laser-guided bomb or cruise missile and less than half the 
size of the smallest precision ordnance dropped from conventional 
aircraft.94 Proportionality inherently covers the notion to control and 
limit collateral damage to civilians and civilian property. This is a 
venerable concept. Grotius writes, “one must take care of, so far as is 
possible, to prevent the death of innocent persons, even by 
accident.”95 Even when a target is purely militant, the element of 
proportionality is still considered when prosecuting a target. 
Proportionality brings with it an obligation to consider all options 
when making targeting decisions: verification of the target; timing of 
the attack; the chosen weapon of choice; and warnings and 
evacuations for civilian populations.96 Drones, with their ability to 
see, think, and act in a controlled manner, provide ample opportunity 
to consider all options before engaging a target. Drone operators, 
after duly considering all options and taking all mitigating maneuvers 
into account, are able to minimize damage to civilian life and 
property.  
(iii) Unnecessary suffering 
The principle of humanity, also commonly referred to as the 
principle of unnecessary suffering, aims to minimize suffering in 
armed conflict.97 The core LOAC concept of unnecessary suffering, a 
concept created to limit damage to civilians while killing combatants, 
is codified in Additional Protocol 1, Article 35(2) “it is prohibited to 
employ weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of 
                                                 
92 Id.   
93 Michael W. Lewis and Emily Crawrord, Drones and Distinction: How IHL 
Encouraged the Rise of Drones, 44 Geo. J. INT'L L. 1151(2013). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 275.  
96 Id. 
97 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.  
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a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering”98 Once 
a military purpose has been achieved, the infliction of further 
suffering is unnecessary.99 A weapon is not banned on the ground of 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering merely because it causes 
great, or even horrendous suffering or injury.100 There is nothing 
unique about the armaments and munitions carried by drones and 
used by their pilots. Thus, Alston, who served as the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
acknowledged in his Study on Targeted Killings that, "a missile fired 
from a drone is no different from any other commonly used weapon, 
including a gun fired by a soldier or a helicopter or gunship that fires 
missiles."101 
Compliance with the principle of unnecessary suffering 
depends upon the kind of weapon used and the kind of suffering that 
it might cause. Weapons can be specifically chosen to satisfy this 
principle; however, compliance with the LOAC depends upon the 
features of the weapon used and the competency of those employing 
the weapon to carry out a particular mission. Also, it is difficult to 
determine what constitutes “unnecessary suffering” because there is 
no globally accepted standard.  
(iv) Military Necessity  
 Finally, “military necessity” means that combatants may only 
employ force against legitimate military objectives.102 The principle of 
military necessity recognizes that a military has the right to use any 
measures not forbidden by the laws of war that are indispensable for 
securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as 
possible.103 Military necessity requires combat-forces to only engage 
                                                 
98 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 80. 
99 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.  
100 Solis, supra note 6, at 270. 
101 Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary 
executions), Study on Targeted Killings, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 
2010).  
102 Toscano, supra note 79.  
103 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.  
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in acts necessary to accomplish a legitimate military objective.104 It 
further permits the killing of enemy combatants and other persons 
whose death is unavoidable.105  The principle of military necessity is a 
principle of controlled violence.106 Military necessity permits the 
destruction of property if that destruction is imperatively demanded 
by the necessities of war.107 Destruction of civilian property as an end 
in-itself is a violation of international law.108 There must be a 
reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the 
overcoming of enemy forces.109 International humanitarian law also 
prohibits weapon systems that cannot be directed at a specific 
military target.110 Over the past few years several U.S. Government 
officials have confirmed that drones are an invaluable tool against Al-
Qaeda, the Islamic State, Taliban, and associated terrorist forces.111 In 
some areas, drones are particularly useful because of their ability to 
find and identify targeted persons, and then reach into territory that 
ground forces cannot enter due to either military or political 
reasons.112 In one reported case, the United States targeted a senior 
Taliban official in the impenetrable border region of Pakistan while 
he was resting on the roof of a house with his wife and hooked up to 
an IV-drip for kidney problems.113 The Taliban member was wanted 
for his involvement in a number of suicide bombings and the 
assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.114 
                                                 
104 ANTHONY FINN & STEVE SCHEDING, DEVELOPMENTS AND 
CHALLENGES FOR AUTONOMOUS UNMANNED VEHICLES: A COMPENDIUM 172 
(2010). 
105 Id.  
106 Gross, supra note 69, at 28.  
107 Finn & Scheding, supra note 104. 
108 Id. 
109 Id.   
110 Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International  
Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics, HARVARD NAT’L SECURITY J., 10 (2013), 
http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Schmitt-Autonomous-
Weapon-Systems-and-IHL-Final.pdf. 
111 Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. 
INT'L L. & POL’Y, 115 (2010-2011). 
112 Id.  
113 Id; See also, Peter Finn & Joby Warrick, Under Panetta, A More Aggressive 
CIA, THE WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/20/AR2010032 003343.html.  
114 Id. 
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In such situations, and others like it, drone strikes offer a "definite 
military advantage."115 Drones, because of advanced technology can 
be very precise in targeted killing. Commanders and their legal 
advisors have ample to make informed decision to go after a target. 
They can easily assess the situation, and are capable of controlling the 
violence.  
B.  Drones as Lawful Weapons 
This section is intended to determine whether current 
weapon laws of LOAC are capable of regulating drones. In modern 
times, LOAC governs the choice of weapons and prohibits or 
restricts the use of certain weapons. Rule 71 of Customary IHL, 
which applies to both international and domestic conflicts, 
establishes the norm that the use of weapons which are 
indiscriminate by nature is prohibited; this norm of customary 
international law is applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflicts.116 In addition, many of the basic rules 
and specific prohibitions and restrictions on means and methods of 
warfare may be found in customary intentional law.117 These 
restrictions can be traced back to treaties and customary international 
law, and are justified on the grounds that weapons which are either: 
(i) indiscriminate in their effect, or (ii) cause unnecessary suffering 
should be prohibited.118  
The Declaration of Saint Petersburg is the first formal 
agreement prohibiting the use of certain weapons in war. “The 
Declaration to that effect adopted in 1868, which has the force of 
                                                 
115 Id.   
116 Rule 71 (Weapons That Are by Nature Indiscriminate), Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, (accessed 7 July 2015)  
https://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter20_rul 71, 
117 Kathleen Lawand, A Guide to Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and 
Methods of Warfare, Measure to implement article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 (2006), 
ICRC, Revised, Geneva, (accessed 22 July 2015) 
http://www.article36.org/wpontent/uploads/2011/12/icrc_002_0902.pdf. 
118 A.G. Houston, Executive Series ADDP 06.4 Law of Armed Conflict, 
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Ed. 1, 4.4,  (2006) http://www.defence.gov.au/ 
adfwc/documents/doctrinelibrary/addp/addp06.4-lawofarmedconflict.pdf. 
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law, confirms the customary rule according to which the use of arms, 
projectiles and materials of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering is 
prohibited.”119 Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 serves as a 
further reference found in international treaties for the need to carry 
out legal reviews of new weapons, means, and methods of warfare. 
The Protocol provides that:  
[I]n the study, development, acquisition or adoption 
of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a 
High Contracting Party (describes a party to any 
international agreement which has both signed and 
ratified the treaty) is under an obligation to determine 
whether its employment would, in some or all 
circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by 
any other rule of international law applicable to the 
High Contracting Party (HCP).120  
“Means of warfare” are weapons and weapon systems, 
whereas “method of warfare” refers to the tactics, techniques and 
procedures by which hostilities are conducted.121 Also, international 
law prohibits two categories of weapons in armed conflict: 
indiscriminate weapons and weapons that cause unnecessary 
suffering.122 The first prohibition appears in Article 51(4) of 
Additional Protocol I, which defines indiscriminate attacks as: (1) 
attacks “not directed at a specific military objective;” (2) attacks 
“which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be 
directed at a military objective;” or (3) attacks “which employ a 
method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as 
required by this Protocol.”123 It is prohibited to “use weapons that are 
                                                 
119 Treaties and State parties to such Treaties, DECLARATION RENOUNCING THE 
USE, IN TIME OF WAR, OF EXPLOSIVE PROJECTILES UNDER 400 GRAMMES 
WEIGHT. SAINT PETERSBURG, 29 NOVEMBER / 11 DECEMBER 1868, ICRC 
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/130?OpenDocument. 
120 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 
TREATIES, ST., PARTIES & COMMENT. (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross), at Article 
35, available at https://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750044?OpenDocument. 
121 Schmit, supra note 110, at 27. 
122 Blank, supra note 70, at 682. 
123 Id.  
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incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.”124 
Examples of inherently indiscriminate weapons are the rockets that 
Hamas and Hezbollah have fired into Israel for many years, cluster 
munitions, and nuclear weapons that destroy all life within the area of 
the detonation. 125 Additionally, weapons that cause unnecessary 
suffering or superfluous injury are prohibited.126 Expanding bullets 
and blinding lasers offer two examples.127 Peter Maurer, the president 
of the International Committee of Red Cross has stated: 
[U]nder international humanitarian law the rules of 
war, i.e. the set of laws governing armed conflict, 
drones are not expressly prohibited, nor are they 
considered to be inherently indiscriminate or 
perfidious. In this respect, they are no different from 
weapons launched from manned aircraft such as 
helicopters or other combat aircraft. It is important to 
emphasize, however, that while drones are not 
unlawful in themselves, their use is subject to 
international law.128  
Therefore, it appears drones comply with the various weapon 
laws, however, when a drone is acting as a “weapons platform,” the 
ordinance carried by the drone is still governed by other specific areas 
of weapons law. For example, if a drone is armed with chemical 
weapons, the applicable law is the convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical 
Weapons and their Destruction.129 Alternatively, if armed with 
‘conventional’ munitions, then the general law of targeting would 
apply (be that treaty law, customary international law, or both).130 
                                                 
124 See, Id. 
125 Id.  
126 Id., at 685.   
127 Id., at 686.  
128 Peter Maurer (the president of the ICRC), The use of armed drones must 
comply with laws, ICRC, (May 10, 2013) https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources 
/documents/interview/2013/05-10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm.  
129 M.N. SCHMITT, LOUISE ARIMATSU, & TIM MCCORMACK, YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 137 (Aug. 5, 2011), (Ian Henderson, chapter: 
Civilian Intelligence Agencies and the use of Armed Drones). 
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Usually, drones carry Hellfire missiles, which are not banned by any 
international treaty or convention and do not have any characteristics 
that cause unnecessary injury. By both measures of weapon laws — 
indiscriminate targeting and preventing unnecessary suffering—
armed drones pass muster.131  
As discussed above, a drone can have advanced technical 
features and extensive surveillance capabilities, and when combined 
with precision-guided Hellfire missile, drones should be considered a 
discriminate weapon system. The ability to track a target for hours, 
even days, before launching an attack facilitates accurate targeting and 
enhances the protection of civilians by allowing drone operators the 
ability to choose the time and place of attack with an intent of 
minimizing civilian casualties or damage.132 Therefore, because armed 
drones can easily target pure military objectives, and have effects that 
can be limited, as much as possible, to military objects, drones thus 
meet the standards of Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I.133 
C.  Lawful Use of Drones Under the LOAC 
Drones, like any weapon, can be used for unlawful purposes, 
especially outside a combat zone. However, because drones are 
lawful weapons, the next step is to analyze their use according to the 
principles of the LOAC; or more particularly, the principles of 
distinction, proportionality, and precaution.  
1. Distinction.  
As discussed above, advanced technology places drones in a 
better position to distinguish between combatants and non-
combatants. Historically, distinction was fairly easy; combatants wore 
uniforms and non-combatants did not. Now, the ‘global war on 
terrorism’ has raised new concerns because terrorists do not wear 
traditional uniforms, and it has become harder to distinguish between 
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civilians and terrorists. Terrorists often take advantage of civilian 
populations and hide themselves among them. The situation has 
raised new challenges for drone operators in regards to distinction. 
State militaries wishing to assert compliance with a legal regime that 
regards human shielding and intermingling with the civilian 
population as unacceptable were pressured to ensure that their 
attacks became increasingly more discriminate and that their 
intelligence became more accurate.134 The challenge found in non-
state armed conflict is identifying the legitimate target. As discussed 
above, Article 48 of Additional Protocol I states that: 
in order to ensure respect for and protection of the 
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to 
the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the 
civilian population and combatants and between 
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly 
shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives.135  
Distinction is also emphasized in Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol 
I:  
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate 
attacks are: 
(a) Those which are not directed at a specific 
military objective; 
(b) Those which employ a method or means of 
combat which cannot be directed at a specific 
military objective; or 
(c) Those which employ a method or means of 
combat the effects of which cannot be limited 
as required by this Protocol; and 
consequently, in each such case, are of a 
                                                 
134 Lewis & Crawrord, supra note 93, at 1153. 
135 Additional Protocol I, available at https://www.icrc.org/ihl/4e473 
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nature to strike military objectives and 
civilians or civilian objects without 
distinction.136   
Furthermore, Article 85 of Protocol I declares that nearly all 
violations of distinction constitute “grave breaches”(foot note 
explaining or one brief sentence) of the Protocol, and the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court similarly criminalizes 
attacks on civilians and indiscriminate attacks.137 However, states 
have historically virtually ignored the principle of distinction by 
employing artillery, rocket launchers, and bombers in assaults on 
irregular forces occupying densely populated areas, resulting in tens 
of thousands of civilian casualties.138 However, in order to minimize 
collateral damage and comply with the principle of distinction states 
began to employ more precise weapons than those designed to defeat 
a more traditional military opponent.139 This is where drones enter 
the picture.140  
The United States has consistently asserted that it complies 
with the LOAC in its battle against Al-Qaeda.141 Examining how the 
U.S. responds to Al-Qaedas’ practice of hiding amongst the civilian 
populations of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen serves as a 
good illustration of how a state military may seek to comply with the 
LOAC's distinction requirements.142 Persons who are members of an 
organized armed group, but dress the same as civilians, either for a 
lack of uniforms or specifically to blend into the civilian population 
for protection, are legitimate targets at all times.143 The United State’s 
need for more robust intelligence greatly increased the demand for 
drones, which were first employed in the conflict with Al-Qaeda as 
real-time intelligence gathering vehicles for distinction purposes.144 
                                                 
136 Article 51, Additional Protocol I, hl/WebART/470-750065" 
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Drones are a better option as compared to boots on ground. Drone 
strikes give militaries more time to analyze the situation; operators 
and decision makers can use the ‘pattern of life’ method to pursue a 
target (analysis, using evidence collected by surveillance cameras on 
the unmanned aircraft and from other sources regarding individuals 
and locations).145 Further, ground forces face the challenge of 
distinguishing between civilians and terrorists more promptly than 
drones, with less situational awareness. Drones may also reduce the 
emotional element for the humans behind the “joy sticks” when 
engaging targets.146 
2. Proportionality. 
Proportionality is closely linked with the principle of 
distinction and correctly identifying objects as military and civilian.147 
For an action to be considered proportional, the anticipated military 
gain must exceed the anticipated damage to civilians and their 
property.148 Article 51(b) of Additional Protocol I proscribes that “an 
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated” is disproportionate.149 Thus, a 
commander must refrain from any attack in which the expected 
civilian casualties will be excessive in light of the anticipated military 
advantage gained.150 Loss of life and damage to property incidental to 
attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage expected to be gained.151 The key here is the word 
                                                 
145 Emptywheel, Pattern of Life drone strikes, SHADOW PROOF, (May 7, 2010) 
https://shadowproof.com/2010/05/06/pattern-of-life-drone-strikes. 
146 P.W. Singer, Military Robots and the Laws of War, NEW ATLANTIS, 25, 40-
41 (Winter 2009), available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/20090203 
_TNA23Singer.pdf/.  
147 Kaag & Kreps, supra note 80, at 94. 
148 Id. 
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150 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.  
151 Four basic principles, LOAC (accessed March 21, 2017) 
http://loacblog.com/loac-basics/4-basic-principles/; See generally  
U.S. Army Field Manual FM27-10: Law of Land Warfare. 
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“incidental,” meaning outside of the military targets or more 
commonly known as “collateral damage.”152 However, if a target is 
purely military (i.e. no civilian component) proportionality is not a 
requirement.153 Proportionality is a necessary consideration in attacks 
on civilians, not on combatants.154 Proportionality brings with it an 
obligation to consider all options when making targeting decisions: 
verifying the target, timing the target, identifying the weapons used, 
warning and evacuating civilian populations.155 Grotius writes, “one 
must take care of, so far as is possible, to prevent the death of 
innocent persons, even by accident.”156 According to CIA Director 
John Brennan: 
Compared against other options, a pilot operating this 
aircraft remotely, with the benefit of technology and 
with the safety of distance, might actually have a 
clearer picture of the target and its surroundings, 
including the presence of innocent civilians. It’s this 
surgical precision, the ability, with laser-like focus, to 
eliminate the cancerous tumor called an al-Qaida 
terrorist while limiting damage to the tissue around it, 
that makes this counterterrorism tool so essential.157 
3. Taking Precautions. 
The principle of precaution is important because it provides 
constant consideration and implementation of precautionary 
measures that reinforces moral clarity for the warfighter thrust into 
terribly complex tactical and operational environments.158 The 
principle of precaution can be further understood by reviewing 
Article 27 of the 1899 Hague Convention: 
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In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps 
should be taken to spare as far as possible edifices 
devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals, 
and places where the sick and wounded are collected, 
provided they are not used at the same time for 
military purposes. The besieged should indicate these 
buildings or places by some particular and visible 
signs, which should previously be notified to the 
assailants.159 
Also, Article 2(3) of the 1907 Hague Convention (IX) further 
states, “[a] commander shall take all due measures in order that the 
town may suffer as little harm as possible.”160 Article 57(2)(c) of 
Additional Protocol I mandates that those who plan or decide upon 
an attack "take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and 
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to 
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and 
damage to civilian objects."161 Additionally, according to article 57 (3) 
of Additional Protocol I, “when a choice is possible between several 
military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the 
objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be 
expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian 
objects.”162 The primary variables of Article 57 may be identified as 
“the time necessary to gather and process the additional information, 
the extent to which it would clarify any uncertainty, competing 
demands on the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance system in 
question, and risk to it and its operators’.163 Finally, according to 
article 58 of Additional Protocol I, the Parties to the conflict shall, to 
the maximum extent feasible: 
                                                 
159 Article 27 of the 1899 Hague Convention, available at http://avalon.law.yale 
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160 Article 2 of the 1907 Hague Convention, available at http://avalon.law.yale 
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161 Article 57 (2) (ii) of AP I, available at https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ih 
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162 Article 57 (3) of AP I,  available at https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ih 
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163 Frederik Rosén, Extremely Stealthy and Incredibly Close: Drones, Control and 
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(a) without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth 
Convention, endeavor to remove the civilian 
population, individual civilians and civilian 
objects under their control from the vicinity of 
military objectives; 
(b) avoid locating military objectives within or near 
densely populated areas; 
(c) take the other necessary precautions to protect 
the civilian population, individual civilians and 
civilian objects under their control against the 
dangers resulting from military operations. This 
principle of avoidance (also known as "taking 
precautions") means that it is not enough not to 
intend to kill civilians while attacking legitimate 
targets.164  
Indeed, a deliberate, affirmative effort has to be made not to 
harm civilians.165 This may mean, for example, that certain targets 
ought to be attacked only during certain hours (e.g., at night, when 
no civilians may be around),’ that some attacks may need to be 
conducted from a certain angle, and that advance warnings to the 
civilian population must be issued by the attacker prior to the 
strike.166 In this regard, drone technology removes a number of 
classic dilemmas related to precaution. Drones leave plenty of time 
for the consideration and execution of precautionary steps.167 Drones 
allow commanders to incorporate precautionary measures in strategy 
formulation, executing signature strikes, and targeted killings.168 
Hours, days, or weeks of surveillance may lie ahead of a drone 
attack.169 It has been argued that there is “strong evidence that drones 
are better, not worse, at noncombatant discrimination.”170 The 
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factors mentioned above do not eliminate the risk of civilian 
casualties, but they certainly represent feasible precautions that can 
minimize incidental loss of civilian life.171 Conversely, drones may not 
be used when other means or methods of warfare that would result 
in less collateral damage with an equivalent prospect of mission 
success are available.”172  
The rules that govern targeting do not turn on the type of weapon 
system used, and there is no prohibition under the laws of war on the 
use of technologically advanced weapons systems in armed conflict--
such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs—so long as they 
are employed in conformity with applicable laws of war.173 In all three 
areas of distinction, proportionality, and precautions—drones’ unique 
and advanced capabilities suggest great potential for adherence to 
LOAC obligations.174 Drones are not automatons; they depend on 
human operators, analysts, and decision makers to comply with the 
laws of war. 
D.  Just War Theory 
The Just War Theory formalizes the moral justifications for 
war.175 It is a lens fixed in the Western philosophical tradition.176 
From the start, Just War theorists have focused on two central 
                                                 
171 Stuart Casey-Maslen, Drone strikes under jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and 
international human rights law, 94 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, NO. 886 AT 601 
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172 Blank, supra note 70, at 686 
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174 Blank, supra note 70, at 701.  
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questions: (1) when is it appropriate to go to war (jus ad bellum), and 
(2) how should the war be fought (jus in bello).177  
1. Jus Ad Bellum. 
Jus ad bellum means the legality of the use of force by a 
territorial state. Jus ad bellum governs the legality of recourse to 
military force (including drone strikes) by one state against another, 
and against armed non-state actors.178 As a threshold matter, the jus 
ad bellum inquiry depends on whether the territorial state has 
consented to the drone strike.179 However, recent history has 
demonstrated that consent of a state is not necessarily required when 
conducting drone operations.180 Article 2(4) is properly interpreted as 
prohibiting all uses of force above a certain minimal level.181 Minimal 
uses of force such as firing a single shot across an international 
boundary might violate the principle of non-intervention, but is 
probably too minor to come within the purview of Article 2(4).182 
The threshold for the occurrence of an armed attack by another state 
thus appears to be relatively high, going beyond a mere frontier 
incident between members of the armed forces of two states (or 
armed groups operating in one state with limited support from 
another state).183 It might even be argued by some that a very limited 
and targeted drone strike by one state, against individuals located in 
another state, would not constitute an armed attack under the UN 
Charter or customary law.184 This argument is based on the highly 
contested concept of anticipatory self-defense (self-defense will be 
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discussed separately in a later section).185 If there is consent, there is 
no infringement on sovereignty.186 Although a definitive answer to 
this factual question is impossible without access to confidential 
material, the publicly available information suggests that states187 have 
given their consent to U.S. drone strikes.188 Because some state have 
publicly withheld their consent, the U.S. must consider whether 
alternative justifications provide a legal basis for continued U.S. 
drone strikes under Just War theory.189 
(i) Jus in Bello 
Jus in bello analysis provides a legal basis for states in 
determining who is an acceptable target, and who is not. The typical 
distinction is between “combatants,” who may be the targets of 
wartime operations, and “non-combatants,” who are exempt from 
being targets of such attacks.190 In essence, jus in bello is the 
foundation for the principles of distinction, proportionality, and 
necessity discussed above. Most legal scholars agree that drone strikes 
are legal under jus in bello as long as they occur during armed 
conflict.191 Nothing is inherently illegal about using drones to kill 
during warfare, just as other airplanes are not forbidden.192 Drones by 
themselves are not really weapons, and the armaments they do carry 
are generally lawful.193  
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IV.  SELF-DEFENSE THEORY 
This section demonstrates the effectiveness of drones in 
executing self-defense operations, illustrated by a case study of the 
U.S. drone strategy during the War on Terror. U.S. national security 
strategy has encompassed the pre-emptive self-defense doctrine since 
the domestic attack that took place on September 11, 2001; 
commonly referred to as “9/11.” This doctrine argues that it is legal 
for a state to launch a pre-emptive attack when it reasonably believes 
that another entity is planning an attack on the state.194 However, the 
U.S. has long recognized the importance of defending its interests, 
both domestically and abroad. In 1854, a U.S. diplomat was attacked 
in the town of San Juan del Norte (Greytown)195, Nicaragua.196 At the 
time of the attack, Greytown had been forcibly seized by forces that 
were politically unrecognized by the U.S., and engaged in other acts 
of violence against U.S. nationals.197 The U.S. Secretary of the Navy 
ordered the bombardment of the town after the enemy force’s refusal 
to adhere to the U.S.’s demand for redress.198 The presidential 
authorization of the military force used in Greytown was later 
challenged in U.S. courts, with each ruling being appealed until the 
case arrived at the Supreme Court.199 Justice Nelson of the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated in the opinion that the President had the 
power to order the responsive use of armed force as part of a power 
of “protection” of U.S. nationals abroad against “acts of lawless 
violence” and “an irresponsible and marauding community.”200 At the 
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time of the ruling, the U.S. did not consider the ongoing conflict with 
Nicaragua, Greytown, or its unrecognized government as “war”.201  
The customary law of a state’s right to self-defense is 
enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.202 Article 51 states: 
[N]othing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense 
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security. Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and 
shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the 
present Charter to take at any time such action as it 
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.  
Article 51 of the Charter expressly affirms the right of a state 
to respond defensively “if an armed attack occurs.”203 “Armed 
attack” is the operative phrase of the text; a state may use force 
against both state and non-state aggressors under a theory of self-
defense. And further, nothing in the language of Article 51 or any 
otherwise relevant customary international law requires consent of 
the state from which a non-state actor attack is emanating, and on 
whose territory a self-defense action takes place against the non-state 
actor.204 Article 51 provides that nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.205 The United States has justified its 
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drone operations occurring outside the context of an armed conflict 
with another state on the basis of this right.206 
In fact, with respect to permissible measures of self-defense 
under Article 51, a form of consent from each member of the United 
Nations already exists in advance by treaty.207 For example, with 
respect to the U.S. use of drones in Pakistan to target Al-Qaeda and 
Taliban forces, it is clear that the U.S. would not need the express 
consent of Pakistan to carry out self-defense targeting.208 It is also 
clear that the U.S. has the right to use drones in Pakistan under 
Article 51 of the Charter in self-defense to protect U.S. interests from 
continuous Al-Qaeda and Taliban attacks launched from Pakistan.209 
There is a growing body of law that generally recognizes the actions 
taken by the U.S. as legal according to international standards. 
According to public reports, U.S. officials have regularly consulted 
with Pakistani authorities when drones have been employed for strike 
operations in Pakistan.210 However, Pakistan maintains only limited 
control over large swaths of its territory, and thus, as a result, 
terrorists have used that ungoverned space to their advantage; in 
response, President Trump and former-President Barack Obama 
have made clear that the United States will act if and when Pakistan 
cannot.211  
V.  GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF DRONE STRIKES AND LOAC 
Under the LOAC, in military operations, the location of a 
strike matters. The LOAC cannot apply places where armed conflict 
does not exist, and the determination of whether armed conflict does 
in-fact exist is based upon the intensity of the violence occurring in 
that given place, in addition to the level of organization employed by 
the forces involved, as laid out in the Tadic opinion.212 The 
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appearance of drones in the arsenal of armed conflict has stimulated 
renewed attempts to define the parameters of the modern 
battlefield.213 The location in which military operations are actually 
taking place at any given time is known as the ‘area of operations,’ 
“the theatre of war,” or simply, the ‘battlefield.’214 Conventional 
LOAC contains references to “zones of military operations,” the 
‘zone of combat,’ and ‘battlefield areas’ although these terms remain 
ambiguous.215 The ever-increasing use of drones in the pursuit of the 
“war on terror” has raised concerns over the emergence of a global 
battlefield whereby the entire planet is subject to the application of 
the LOAC.216  
For the past several years, the geographical location of drone 
attacks has expanded at a rapid rate; Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, 
Somalia, and Libya have all been subject to drone strikes under the 
blanket justification of fighting terrorism.217 Some of these strikes, 
such as those in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Libya, fall within the 
generally recognized parameters of an armed conflict. Others, such as 
those in Yemen and Somalia, raise more complicated questions 
regarding where force is being used and what that means in terms of 
the application of the LOAC.218 These concerns primarily stem from 
frequent drone strikes occurring outside the ‘active battlefields’ of 
Afghanistan and into the bordering regions of Pakistan, Yemen, and 
Somalia.219  
Drone strikes blur the geographical boundaries of the 
battlefield. In traditional conflicts, military operations were confined 
to the territories of the actors and were not supposed to spillover to 
neutral states.220 The law of neutrality generally “defines the 
relationship under international law between states engaged in an 
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armed conflict and those that are not participating in that conflict.”221 
Neutrality law thus led to a geographic-based framework in which 
belligerents can fight on belligerent territory or the commons, but 
must refrain from any operations on neutral territory.222 In essence, 
the battle space in a traditional armed conflict between two or more 
states is anywhere outside the sovereign territory of any of the neutral 
states.223 However, because the U.S. drone program largely targets 
non-state actors that freely move across borders, laws of neutrality 
have become less effective. 
The U.S. government operates two drone programs.224 The 
military’s version, which is publicly acknowledged, operates in the 
recognized war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, and targets enemies of 
the U.S. military stationed there. As such, the program is an extension 
of conventional warfare.225 The C.I.A.'s program is aimed at terror 
suspects around the world, including countries where U.S. troops are 
not based.226 The program is classified as covert, and the intelligence 
agency declines to provide any information to the public about where 
it operates, how it selects a target, who is in charge, or how many 
casualties the program has led to.227 It is contended that drone strikes 
in places like Yemen and Pakistan violate international law because 
there is no currently recognized conflict between these states and the 
US.228  
However, just a few weeks after the attacks of 9/11, 
President George W. Bush laid the foundation for the notion of the 
whole world as a battlefield when he pronounced, “our war on terror 
will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the 
past. This war will be fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or 
plan.”229 The Obama Administration has not specifically adopted that 
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same language calling for a global battlefield, but has actually 
significantly expanded the use of drone strikes outside of 
Afghanistan.230 Al-Qaeda maintains a strong presence in a number of 
countries, most notably Yemen and Somalia, and uses such states to 
recruit, train, and plan attacks against the United States and its allies. 
The United States has repo1rtedly conducted limited drone 
operations in such countries.231 Somalia and Yemen present an even 
more compelling case (than say Pakistan) of a neutral status; both 
states are considered “failed states” and are unable to consent or 
object to U.S. actions and the U.S. has not formally acknowledged 
the use of force in these states.232  
However, according to Authorization for Use of Military 
Force (AUMF) passed by Congress in the days following 9/11: 
the President is authorized to use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 
or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred 
on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any 
future acts of international terrorism against the 
United States by such nations, organizations or 
persons.233  
If consent was given by a state and U.S. personnel engaged a 
target authorized by the AUMF, the strike would arguably be covered 
under AUMF authority and fall within the LOAC.234 Therefore, the 
U.S. is not territorially limited when conducting operations against 
non-state participants.235 Moreover, there is no question that 
Pakistan's territory falls within the greater AUMF theater of conflict. 
U.S. officials have argued that the fight with AUMF enemies is 
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global, not confined to the territory of one country.236 In fact, most 
of the leadership and many of the fighters intended to be covered by 
the AUMF are located outside of Afghanistan and within Pakistan's 
borders.237 
Thus, location matters, but it is not overly prohibitive.238 The 
U.S. has consistently made the case that the war with Al-Qaeda and 
its terrorist associates is of global reach.239 The epicenter is in 
Afghanistan (and to a lesser extent Iraq), but Al-Qaeda and its 
offshoots, as transnational non-state actors, operate in and wage war 
from states across the world.240  
VI.  COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY DURING DRONE OPERATIONS 
 Under the LOAC and international criminal law, military 
personnel are criminally responsible for any war crimes they commit 
during war.241 In the case of drones, the most controversial aspect of 
a drone program is the legal status of the operator.242 Military 
commanders often consult their staff judge advocates (SJAs), 
especially in the escalation of conflict.243 Seeking legal advice is 
increasing and has become prevalent, even in the battle space.244 “It is 
also clear from the commanders . . . that legal advice is essential to 
effective combat operations in the current environment—legal advice 
is now part of the tooth not the tail.”245 
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Even those who support nearly every other aspect of drone 
warfare find themselves uneasy with civilian personnel performing 
combat functions.246 According to Peter Maurer, the president of the 
ICRC:  
Although the operators of remote-controlled 
weapons systems such as drones may be far from the 
battlefield, they still run the weapon system, identify 
the target and fire the missiles. They generally operate 
under responsible command; therefore, under 
international humanitarian law, drone operators and 
their chain of command are accountable for what 
happens. The fact of their being thousands of 
kilometers away from the battlefield does not absolve 
drone operators and their chain of command of their 
responsibilities, which include upholding the 
principles of distinction and proportionality, and 
taking all necessary precautions in attack. Drone 
operators are thus no different than the pilots of 
manned aircraft such as helicopters or other combat 
aircraft as far as their obligation to comply with 
international humanitarian law is concerned, and they 
are no different as far as being targetable under the 
rules of international humanitarian law.247  
Military drone operators live and work in the US, leading 
relatively normal civilian lives outside of their occupation.248 Unlike 
deployed personnel who remain in a combat environment 
continuously, drone operators maintain more stereotypical 
employment; they come in to work each day, gather intelligence, 
execute strikes when required, and return home for dinner.249 All the 
while, military drone operators and their chain of command are 
subject to the laws of war. 
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However, command responsibility is not as clearly defined 
when drone operations are conducted by the CIA. The CIA follows, 
or at least professes to follow, the laws of armed conflict.250 As 
discussed above, the CIA operates one of the two drone programs 
for the U.S. The CIA program is not considered a military program, 
is not operated as one, and is not governed “by the same 
international protocols on the conduct of war” as the Department of 
Defense.251 The clandestine and largely unaccountable nature of the 
CIA program creates the most ambiguities for Just War theorists.252 
According to Philip Alston U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary, or arbitrary executions: 
Intelligence personnel do not have immunity from 
prosecution under domestic law for their conduct. 
They are thus unlike State armed forces which would 
generally be immune from prosecution for the same 
conduct.... Thus, CIA personnel could be prosecuted 
for murder under the domestic law of any country in 
which they conduct targeted drone killings, and could 
also be prosecuted for violations of applicable U.S. 
law.253  
Alston is not alone in this assessment of CIA drone pilots’ 
status. As noted by Rayan Vogel, a Foreign Affairs Specialist, and 
member of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. 
Department of Defense:  
The CIA is a civilian agency and not a branch of the 
U.S. Armed Forces. Even under a liberal reading of 
Article 4 from GC III, the CIA would not meet the 
requirements of lawful belligerency as a militia or 
volunteer corps because, while they do report to a 
responsible chain of command (albeit not always a 
military chain of command), as a group they do not 
wear uniforms or otherwise distinguish themselves, 
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nor do they carry their arms openly. CIA personnel 
are therefore unprivileged belligerents in this 
conflict.254 
Gary Solis agrees with this assessment and has opined at 
some length on the status of CIA drone operators as unprivileged 
belligerents:  
Those CIA agents are, unlike their military 
counterparts but like the fighters they target, unlawful 
combatants. No less than their insurgent targets, they 
are fighters without uniforms or insignia, directly 
participating in hostilities, employing armed force 
contrary to the laws and customs of war. Even if they 
are sitting in Langley, the CIA pilots are civilians 
violating the requirement of distinction, a core 
concept of armed conflict, as they directly participate 
in hostilities...it makes no difference that CIA civilians 
are employed by, or in the service of, the U.S. 
government or its armed forces. They are civilians; 
they wear no distinguishing uniform or sign, and if 
they input target data or pilot armed drones in the 
combat zone, they directly participate in hostilities--
which means they may be lawfully targeted .... 
Moreover, CIA civilian personnel who repeatedly and 
directly participate in hostilities may have what recent 
guidance from the International Committee of the 
Red Cross terms "a continuous combat function." 
That status, the ICRC guidance says, makes them 
legitimate targets whenever and wherever they may be 
found, including Langley.255 
When the laws of armed conflict were developed, there was 
no technology such as drones used in the battlefield. Perhaps, new 
laws should be developed, especially to protect and guide drone 
operators. Drones are different than traditional forces that must react 
promptly to various hostile situations and make decisions within their 
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own judgment. In the case of drones, it is conceivable that the 
President may become involved with the assistance of military and 
legal advisors before authorizing a drone operator to engage a target. 
Therefore, the laws delineating command responsibility in both 
drone programs need to be updated and promulgated to ensure 
operations conform with the LOAC.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This article has demonstrated that current laws are capable of 
governing drone warfare. The fundamental principles of the law of 
armed conflict, specialized weapons treaties, The Hague and Geneva 
conventions, customary law, and the UN Charter all provide a 
thorough legal backdrop to govern the usage of drones.256 As with all 
weapons, it is essential to ensure that drone attacks are launched only 
against legitimate military objectives in accordance with the laws 
governing the use of force.257 The sole legal issue specific to drone 
operations under both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello is weapon 
choice.258 As correctly noted by Special Reporter Alston, “a missile 
fired from a drone is no different from any other commonly used 
weapon, including a gun fired by a soldier or a helicopter or gunship 
that fires missiles. The critical legal question is the same for each 
weapon: whether its specific use complies with LOAC.”259 Drones 
provide a legally permissible use of force to support self-defense.260 
Drone attacks can occur against state or non-state actors located in a 
foreign country from which the armed attacks emanate even though 
there is no special consent of the foreign state, no imputation of the 
non-state actor’s attacks to the foreign state, no armed conflict 
between the foreign state and the United States, and the foreign state 
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is willing or unable to stop the attacks.261 However, the legal status of 
drone operators remains as a challenging legal question while the 
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